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Abstract 
This study aims to help identify how the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) could 
potentially constrain government action to achieve food security in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). The paper considers the proposed tariff and subsidy 
reduction modalities of the current round of WTO negotiations. The main focus is on 
the potential direct effects of the AoA, in terms of proposed reductions to domestic 
subsidies and tariffs, on food security policy in SADC countries. The study examines 
the argument that subsidy reductions and further liberalizing market access may pose 
constraints on the food security policy options of governments within the region. 
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1 Introduction 
The significance of agriculture to African countries and to the central concern of food 
security were highlighted by the African Group joint proposal on the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) negotiations on agriculture (WTO 2001b). The proposal noted that 
while agriculture remained the single most important sector of African economies, it 
remains seriously underdeveloped which ‘reinforces and perpetuates the low growth 
syndrome and pervasive poverty including high levels of food deprivation that 
characterize many African countries’ (pg. 1, para 2). The proposal deals with issues of 
market access, export competition and domestic support, and it devotes an entire sub-
section to the special concerns of least developed countries (LDCs) and net food 
importing developing countries (NFIDCs). 
Agricultural trade has grown globally, with developing countries contributing an 
increasing share of exports in the period 1993-98 from 40.1 per cent to 42.4 per cent. 
However, LDCs have seen a reversal in their share of the market. Importantly, these 
LDCs have experienced deteriorating trade balances in food crops and food. In the 
decade 1990-2000, LDC food imports have increased by 5 per cent per annum, notably 
in the food groups of oilseeds and oils, meat and meat preparations, and sugar (FAO 
2003). 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) emerging from the Uruguay Round brought 
agriculture under the WTO disciplines applied to goods and tropical agricultural 
products. It focused on the tariffication of agricultural protection measures, the 
limitations of domestic support programmes and of export subsidies. Its main 
achievement was not greater levels of liberalization, but rather the establishment of a 
framework for future agricultural liberalization.  
There has been much concern over the possible negative impact of the AoA on 
agriculture and rural livelihoods in developing countries. Three main issues have arisen: 
Has the Agreement resulted in changes in domestic agriculture policies in development 
countries? How much flexibility do developing countries have under the current 
agreement? And what is the current and potential impact of the agreements on national 
food security? Researchers have concluded that at present the AoA has not had a 
significant impact in either constraining government policy options or curtailing 
agricultural development programmes for the poor (see Matthews 2000).  
In the course of the WTO negotiations, different views on how to take into account 
nontrade concerns have been raised. The most contentious issues concern food security, 
livelihoods and poverty alleviation, rural development, environmental issues, food 
safety and animal welfare. LDCs and NFIDCs see a clear link between the case for 
concessionary modalities towards these non-trade issues and the overarching objective 
of levelling global disparities through liberalization of agricultural trade.  
LDCs have acquired a degree of support for their concerns over the food security issue 
from a broad spectrum of stakeholders. There is general consensus that a mechanism is 
required to ensure that food aid does not disrupt domestic production in recipient 
countries. But what actually constitutes ‘disruption’ is not agreed, and there is 
disagreement on how the impact can or should be evaluated. In food crisis situations, 
such as the recent southern African famine, stakeholders accept that WTO agreements  
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should not hinder ‘food aid’ delivery. Furthermore, there were significant differences on 
the following important issues: 
—  The criteria for types of food aid; 
—  The provision of grants, thus facilitating regional procurement, verses direct 
food aid; 
—  The issue of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) and environmental 
concerns; and 
—  The need for a commitment to not reduce food aid volumes when prices 
increase. 
Within the debate there is acceptance that developed countries have a role in providing 
continued technical and financial cooperation to LDCs for enhancing agricultural 
productivity, diversifying crop production, marketing information dissemination, export 
development, and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. It is not clear how far this 
developmental role should go or where its boundaries should end. Furthermore, the 
implications of financial and technical support in terms of the negotiations on trade have 
not been fully considered. 
Many commentators agree that the provisions of the AoA do not, at the present juncture, 
constrain countries from implementing policies that can promote and protect national 
and household food security. One reason is that the agreed market access and subsidy 
targets have limited impact since the special and differential exemptions (S&D) and de 
minimis provisions are adequate. However, it has been argued that the AoA provides a 
framework for the global agreement of trade rules which could constrain country actions 
with respect to domestic subsidies, tariffs and export subsidies—the three main issues 
on the current agenda of negotiations. 
This study aims to help identify how the AoA could potentially constrain government 
action to achieve food security in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) countries through the proposed tariff and subsidy reduction modalities. The 
research focuses squarely on the current agriculture negotiations. The main focus is on 
the direct effects of the agreement on food security policy in SADC—hence, the 
domestic subsidy and market access concerns. It is believed that these effects may pose 
constraints on the policy options of governments, the question that we seek to address in 
the SADC context. The study focuses on policy constraints and not what optimal food 
security policies (including tariffs and subsidies) should be.  
The paper does not does not substantially consider trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights (TRIPS) agreements and the agreement on SPS measures. Nor does it 
consider the indirect effect on developing countries resulting from the reduction of 
export subsidies and preference erosion in developed countries stemming from the AoA. 
This topic has been extensively analysed. The study does, however, examine the 
feasibility of the Marrakech Decision in addressing LDC and NFIDC food security 
concerns.  
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1.1  The initial agriculture agreement 
The purpose of the AoA in the Uruguay Round was first and foremost to bring 
agriculture under the disciplines of the WTO. The Uruguay Round saw considerable 
pressure to liberalize the agriculture sector. This is apparent from the commitments that 
countries made under agriculture, especially developing countries: 
Subsidies 
The initial agreement provided enormous scope for developing countries to provide 
domestic support for their agricultural sectors, despite registering low levels of actual 
aggregate measures of support (AMS). Not only was the de minimis level set at a high 
10 per cent of the value of production, but Article 6.2 provided special and differential 
(S&D) provisions for investment and input subsidies for resource–poor farmers (a key 
element of food security at the household level). Developing countries could also take 
advantage of the Green Box provisions for nontrade-distorting agricultural support. At 
the time, all SADC countries with the exception of Mozambique were providing trade-
distorting domestic support for producers beyond the support for resource-poor farmers 
only. Of particular importance were credit and input subsidization (e.g., general 
fertilizer price subsidies and low interest loans), and price support. However, only South 
Africa was forced by the agreement to reduce support as it had an AMS that fell outside 
the de minimis at the time (its AMS was 5.9 per cent of production).1 For the other 
SADC countries, Malawi offered the greatest level of support at 2.9 per cent of 
production. As a result, many have failed to even notify support that fell within the 
Green Box as total support (Green Box, S&D and Blue/Amber Box) fell below the de 
minimis. 
Market access 
In terms of tariffs, developing countries were allowed a once-off opportunity to bind all 
tariffs at a high ceiling rate that far exceeded their applied tariffs. SADC members not 
part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) took full advantage of this 
provision and bound all tariff lines covered by the agreement at very high ceiling rates 
(with the exception of a few selected tariff lines). Zimbabwe bound at 150 per cent, 
Malawi and Zambia at 125 per cent, Mauritius at 122 per cent, Mozambique at 100 per 
cent and Angola and the DRC at 55 per cent. These bound rates far exceeded actual 
tariffs that have a mean between 18 per cent and 28 per cent for non-SACU members of 
SADC. This implies substantial ‘water’ in the tariffs, giving countries considerable 
scope for further reductions in future negotiations before actual tariff rates are affected. 
It also currently provides them with scope to increase actual tariffs in response to a 
perceived threat to their agricultural sector without breaking their WTO commitment. 
The fact that LDCs were not required to make any reductions in the Uruguay Round 
(which would apply to Angola, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) was 
therefore largely irrelevant given the high bound rates. SACU countries—South Africa, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland—operate with a common external tariff 
and therefore their applied tariffs are identical. However, the SACU agreement permits 
individual countries some limited deviation for the purpose of industry development. 
                                                 
1   Note that South Africa is classified as a developed economy within the WTO and so faced the lower 
AMS level of 5 per cent.  
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SACU therefore bound around the lowest common denominator—South Africa—at far 
lower rates (a mean bound rate of 34 per cent). Whilst Lesotho bound at 200 per cent 
without any exceptions, they still implement the lower applied rates of SACU. 
However, despite the lower binding, there is still considerable ‘water’ in the SACU 
bound rates, as their mean tariff in 2003 was only 8.6 per cent (and a median of 0 per 
cent). Some of these bindings must have impacted on applied tariffs, as 27.4 per cent of 
SACU tariffs were bound at the applied rate in 2003 (though only 5.6 per cent were 
bound at non-zero rates). 
1.2  The current round 
Whilst the initial agreement did not affect food security policy in SADC, the current 
Doha Round has the potential to do so, given that it envisages far deeper agricultural 
liberalization. The Doha Round may fail to deliver on these promises given the 
widespread opposition to significant agricultural reform. This is apparent by the fact that 
there is still no agreed modality for agricultural liberalization in the Doha Round despite 
four years of negotiation. The Draft General Council Decision of 31 July 2004 (WTO 
2004) is only a framework for establishing modalities, and lacks any clear details of 
formulae for both domestic support and market access liberalization. The only clarity it 
provides is that LDCs will not be required to make any reduction commitments. This is 
important to SADC as seven of the 14 members are classified as LDCs by the WTO 
(Angola, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia). The 
agriculture negotiations thus present no direct threat to these countries. However, they 
still have an interest in negotiations because they will be bound by the negotiated 
provisions should they be reclassified as developing countries at a later point. The 
clearest modalities are contained in the texts circulated around the time of the Cancun 
Ministerial in July 2003, specifically the joint US-EU text, the Group of 20 Developing 
Countries (G20) text and the Debraz text that sought to compromise between the two. 
Whilst none of these texts were agreed, they provide an insight into what key players 
are thinking and the shape of modalities that may emerge in the end. Given the lack of a 
clear modality, the focus of the paper is to identify which modalities might potentially 
threaten current SADC food security policies. 
2  Subsidies: domestic support and export subsidies 
2.1 Negotiating  texts 
The Draft General Council Decision of 31 July 2004 reaffirmed its support for special 
and differential treatment as laid out in Article 6.2 of the AoA. Furthermore, Paragraph 
45 of the Annex on Agriculture states that LDCs will be exempt from all reductions. 
The draft calls for a tiered reduction in all measures of support to achieve some 
harmonization. In terms of specific categories of support: 
—  Aggregate measures of support  (AMS): tiered approach to achieve greater cuts 
for those with higher AMSs;  
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—  De minimis: developing countries that allocate most of their de minimis to 
subsistence and poor farmers will be exempt;2 
—  Blue Box: should not exceed 5 per cent of a member’s total value of 
agricultural production; 
—  Green Box: criteria to be reviewed to ensure no trade-distorting effects;  
—  Export subsidies: to be phased out with a longer-time period for developing 
countries. 
This text is a clear compromise between the joint US-EU text and the G20 text, and is 
not dissimilar to the Debraz text. It calls for a tiered approach (G20), offers scope for 
greater support by developing countries (G20), specifically no commitments from LDCs 
(G20), whilst setting overall limits (US-EU and G20) and a 5 per cent maximum on the 
Blue Box (US-EU). What needs to be negotiated is the specific tier formula for 
reductions in total support and AMSs.  
2.2 Potential  constraints to SADC countries 
Whilst the original commitments under the AoA were not constraining, there has since 
been a dramatic shift away from general producer subsidies of one form or another in 
SADC. Additionally, there has been a growing focus on targeted support for 
smallholder farmers (the S&D provision) and more general support measures that would 
fall within the Green Box provisions. The primary reason for these shifts in agricultural 
strategy has been structural adjustment policies aimed at reducing state debt and 
improving the sustainability of the fiscus. This is particularly evident amongst the LDCs 
(especially Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) that have effectively 
eliminated all support for commercial farmers.  
The currently applied and notified support measures offered by SADC countries, 
including the value of that support where data are available, are shown in Table 1. It is 
ordered into the LDCs (no reduction obligations), developing countries and developed 
economies (South Africa only). The table provides some insights into how SADC food 
security policies might be threatened by any proposed reductions in agricultural 
subsidies.  
It is only the wealthier SADC members (notably South Africa) that are able to sustain 
these support measures fiscally, but even these countries have cut back on such support. 
The reduction also does not appear to be WTO driven, because the reductions have been 
dramatic and the current level of support is well below the permissible bound levels. For 
instance, South Africa has a US$310 million limit on total AMS on top of the R750 
million de minimis allocation but has reduced total support to US$70 million (or only 
1.72 per cent of production). It has also eliminated export subsidies even though it is 
permitted an expenditure of US$100 million. Most SADC countries have reduced their 
Green Box expenditure, a measure not required under the AoA. For instance, Zambia 
reduced Green Box support from 12 per cent to 5.5 per cent of the value of production, 
and Namibia from 4.7 per cent to 1.8 per cent. 
 
                                                 
2 Essentially this is in lieu of a development box that has been a constant call from developing countries.  
 
Table 1
SADC domestic support, current (WTO notified and applied)
Least developed countries Developing countries Developed
Domestic support commitment Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Tanzania Zambia Botswana Namibia Mauritius Swaziland Zimbabwe South Africa
S&D ‘Box'   
Production (inputs & technology)  A N A N A N A A
for resource poor farmers
Technology and animal subsidies  A A N A
Welfare transfers (assets & land)  A A N A
Investment subsidies  A A N
Value (% of production)  0.73 0.88 0.48 (1.5)*
Green Box (Annex 2) 
General public agricultural services:
Administration A A A A N A A A A A N
Research A A NN N A A NN
Pest and disease control A A A A NN N A NN
Training A A A A N A A A A NN
Extension service A A A A NN N A A NN
Inspection services A A A A N A A A A NN
Marketing A N A A
Resource conservation A A A A A A A A A A N
Infrastructure A NN A A NN
Food stockholding  A A A
Domestic food aid  A A A A A A A
Blue Box 
Direct payments to producers:
Domestic support commitment
Decoupled income support  
Income insurance N 
Disaster relief NN  




Value (% of production)  5.50 1.84 0.62 5.56 (4.06) **
 
Credit subsidization  A A N
Inputs subsidization  A A A  
Infrastructure (on-farm) development  A  
Resource allocation  N
Price support  A A N
Value (% of production)  1.72
Other (product and non-product AMS) 
Notes: N=WTO notified; A=applied support (authors' assessment); *Although notified under the Green Box, South Africa offers substantial development aid (R323 
to producers in disadvantaged areas to encourage agriculture and rural development (predominately former homelands). This might be considered S&D.




We therefore conclude that in light of the substantial changes in food security and general 
agricultural policy within the region, shifting from a focus on national production to an 
increasing dependence on trade, reductions in the de minimis are still highly unlikely to dig 
into current domestic support. Furthermore, much of the support outside of the Green Box is 
targeted at resource-poor farmers and so would fall within the S&D provision (i.e., exempt 
from de minimis). However, even this is small in comparison to likely de minimis reductions. 
For example, in Malawi, policies under the S&D provision are valued at only 0.73 per cent of 
the value of production, while in Zambia the figure is 0.88 per cent of production. Namibia, 
the only other country where data are available through notifications, had a total S&D 
provision value of 0.48 per cent of production. South Africa, which has listed development aid 
under the Green Box, reaches 1.5 per cent of production. In contrast, Green Box support is 
1.84 per cent of production for Namibia, 5.5 per cent for Zambia and 4.06 per cent for South 
Africa (excluding the development aid of 1.5 per cent).  
Although current subsidy proposals pose no real constraint on SADC countries, it may still be 
strategically important for SADC countries to try retaining a high de minimis level for 
themselves in order to provide policy space for the future. It is apparent that whilst most 
countries offer typical Green Box support for their agricultural sector (of varying sizes), more 
extensive support is mostly offered by those that can afford to (i.e., the developing countries 
and South Africa). This is evident from the range and value of support under S&D provisions, 
Blue Box and trade-distorting support measures. As income in these countries grows, they 
may be more able to provide domestic support and may wish to do so in order to accelerate 
agricultural growth. We have argued elsewhere (Charman and Hodge 2005) that if the poorer 
countries in the region are to attain food security, then the levels of support to agriculture need 
to be increased substantially. This includes policies that may not fall into the S&D provision 
or Green Box; for instance support for emerging farmers and long-term welfare transfers 
(especially in light of the devastation caused by AIDS in rural areas).  
A further reason for caution is that there is no clarity on whether extra-budgetary foreign aid 
(government and nongovernmental organization aid) may be included in the estimation of 
domestic support for countries in the region. This support is substantial and could raise 
measures of support considerably. SADC countries should recognize the advantage of keeping 
de minimis support bindings at levels that far exceed current and possibly future support. 
Policy space will allow developing countries to offer trade concessions without harming 
current strategies. In this regard, is also important for SADC countries to begin notifying their 
Green Box policies. The bulk of support in the region falls within the Green Box, and 
notification ensures that fiscal resources allocated to these support measures are not lumped in 
with general AMS or the S&D provision. This would provide them with even greater 
differences between actual support, and support permitted within the de minimis allocation. 
Such a strategy allows developing countries more scope to accept a reduction in their own de 
minimis in return for greater reductions from the developed countries in future negotiations. It 
also assists in the negotiation process as it demonstrates that current requirements are 
appropriate.  
3 Market  access 
3.1 Negotiating  texts 
The Draft General Council Decision of 31 July 2004 provides few details on what modalities 
will be used to address tariff reductions in the Doha Round. It merely notes agreement to use a  
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tiered formula that will be applied to bound, not applied, rates and that each member may 
designate a number of tariff lines as sensitive products that will receive more flexible 
treatment. It also reaffirms that developing countries will receive special and differential 
treatment on all aspects of the modality and a special safeguard mechanism will be established 
for their use. Finally, LDCs will be exempt from any reductions.  
The US-EU and G20 texts provide at least some insights into the thinking of key members of 
what tiered formulae might be used. The EU-US Joint Text provides for a blended formula for 
tariff reduction that would include lower requirements for developing countries. The blended 
formula is comprised of the following components:  
i)  [.] per cent of tariff lines subject to a [.] per cent average tariff cut and a  
minimum of [.] per cent; 
ii)  [.] per cent of tariff lines subject to a Swiss formula coefficient [.]; 
iii)  [.] per cent of tariff lines shall be duty-free; and 
iv)  A maximum tariff of [.] per cent. 
In contrast, the G20 proposed framework is harder on developed economies but softer on 
developing. For developed economies, the average cut for [] per cent of lines is replaced by a 
linear cut for [.] per cent of lines. It also looks to address tariff escalation in these countries. 
For developing countries, the G20 proposal calls for only an average cut of [.] per cent with a 
minimum cut of [.] per cent for all lines, except where tariff bindings are already low (no 
reduction) or for special products (SP) (minimum linear cut). No maximum tariffs, no Swiss 
formula and no duty-free tariffs. 
The proposed modality included as an annex to the Cancun Ministerial (Debraz text), largely 
follows the EU-USA text for developed countries (but includes tariff escalation). For 
developing countries, it also follows the EU-US text but with some concessions. These 
include [.] per cent of tariffs bound between 0 and 5 per cent instead of being bound duty-free, 
and the two exceptions to the average cut proposed by the G20 (the SP designation and no 
reduction on low tariffs). 
3.2  Constraints on SADC countries 
SADC countries, going into negotiations, need to assess what sort of tariff structure would 
best suit their development objectives in agriculture. It is thought that many SADC countries 
would identify modest tariffs as necessary to provide incentives for production of both raw 
and processed food products. Regional food production needs to be encouraged because it is 
cheaper than food imports for many food staples in the region, and would limit the extent to 
which countries struggle to import their basic requirements. Production incentives are also 
negatively affected by occasional low and variable prices that result from high levels of 
subsidization in the developed countries3 and surplus dumping in time of a global glut.4 An 
important consideration is the high transport cost both in reaching the region and within the 
                                                 
3   For instance, SACU’s tariff on wheat is purely to counteract the European subsidies. 
4   Surplus dumping in times of global glut does not justify a high applied tariff but rather a high bound tariff 
that gives scope to raise a low applied tariff in these periods. A safeguard mechanism, alternatively, can 
achieve the same goal.  
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region. Transport costs offer some degree of protection (mainly to landlocked countries in the 
region), and this should be reflected in lower tariff levels. The exception is if the threat is from 
regional producers such as South Africa or Zimbabwe. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) similarly 
afford protection to the domestic producers. However, NTBs are second-best tools because 
they work against the rapid and effective importation of food in times of crisis. In contrast, 
tariffs can be adjusted downwards in crisis years to facilitate imports and thus reduce the price 
of food to the consumer.  
This paper does not attempt to determine an optimal tariff regime for each SADC country. It 
is however apparent—from an examination of agricultural tariffs at a detailed level for many 
SADC countries—that there has been little strategic thinking in this regard. The setting of 
tariffs has been motivated, for some SADC members, by the fiscus dependence on tariff 
revenue. Often blanket rates are applied to an entire range of products without regard of 
whether or not it is necessary to fulfil a policy objective. For instance, most of Malawi’s 
tariffs are either 10 or 40 per cent, for Mozambique they are 2.5, 7.5 or 35 per cent, for 
Zambia 5, 15 or 25 per cent. Whilst there are definite benefits to the simplicity of the tariff 
regime, these tariff decisions are also evidence of the weak trade negotiation pressure on 
government policy. SADC countries have not carefully considered which tariffs are important 
and which are not and thus can be given up strategically in trade negotiations. Simplicity can 
still remain through binding at 0 per cent irrelevant tariffs. We now consider whether the 
negotiating modalities will make reduction of some tariffs unavoidable or not.  
3.4 Tariff  reductions 
The exclusion of LDCs from making any reduction commitments in this round clearly implies 
that the negotiations, at this point, offer no threat to most of the SADC countries. For the non-
LDCs the threat to existing policy differs according to the type of formula that may be used in 
negotiations. Tables 2 and 3 examine the implications on all current agricultural tariff (Table 2) 
and food security tariff lines separately (Table 3) from different formulae (based on existing 
proposals) and different coefficients applied to these formulae. Our analysis considers a range of 
products as ‘food security products’, not simply staple cereals, but other components necessary 
for a diversified nutritional diet (meats, dairy, starchy roots, vegetables, fruit/nuts). The analysis 
further includes the main regional cash crops, as these are inextricably linked to regional food 
security and are part of the smallholder cropping strategy.  
Whilst the LDCs are included for completeness, the main focus is on the developing countries 
(Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) and the one developed 
country (South Africa). It must be noted that the members of the SACU have a common 
external tariff and so will experience the same reductions. There is some scope within SACU to 
have special safeguards for development, and so the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland) may be able to bind at a higher level. Lesotho has already bound most 
of its agricultural tariffs at 200 per cent; other LDC may follow this trend in the current round. 
Our analysis, however, examines SACU tariffs as a single entity.  
Most SADC countries used the opportunity in the Uruguay Round to bind at very high tariff 
levels, over 100 per cent. The main exception was SACU (mean bound rate of 34 per cent) as 
there was greater pressure on South Africa to bind lower. Across the region, applied tariffs are 
much lower than bound rates, with mean applied rates in the range of 15-20 per cent, with 
Zimbabwe the highest with 27 per cent and SACU the lowest with 8.6 per cent. This means that 
there is considerable ‘air’ in the tariffs, which can protect these countries from possible large  
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average cuts in future negotiations. For example, were SADC countries to undergo average cuts 
of 60 per cent, the effect on applied tariffs would be negligible or none. SACU is the exception 
where 5.6 per cent of tariff lines are bound at their applied rate and so a cut of any magnitude 
will enforce a reduction. But because the median tariff in SACU is 0 per cent, cuts of greater 
and greater magnitude do not have vastly different effects on the number of lines affected.  
The EU-US joint text proposed a maximum tariff as a means to harmonize and bring some 
extreme bindings in developing countries to a level that is closer to applied rates. Yet it is the 
developing, rather than the developed, countries with SADC that make use of high maximum 
tariffs. This may in part be due to the imposition of structural adjustment programmes where 
tariff reduction and simplification are often components. Given that the developing countries are 
the ones that will face reduction commitments, the use of a maximum tariff in the formula is 
likely to significantly affect Mauritius and Zimbabwe, as well as even at levels of 40 per cent 
(this would affect 30 per cent of Mauritius tariff lines and 44 per cent of Zimbabwe’s). SACU 
has few very high tariffs and would therefore be marginally affected by the use of a maximum 
in the formula, even at levels of 20 per cent (this would affect on 13 per cent of SACU tariff 
lines).  
Table 2 
Impact on SADC Agricultural tariff lines from different formula and coefficients 









































































Mean  tariffs,  %                
Mean bound tariff, %  53.0  54.0 124.0 100.0 120.0 125.0  120.0 150.0  34.0 
Mean applied tariff, %  9.7  13.5  15.5 16.2 18.0 18.6 20.5  27.4  8.6 
Median applied tariff, %  5.0  10.0 10.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 15.0  25.0  0.0 
Maximum applied tariff, %  35.0  20.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 80.0  100.0  55.0                  
Average  cut            
% of lines affected by average cut of                 
20%  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.1  10.2 
30%  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.1  11.4 
40%  4.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  7.1 4.7  15.3 
50%  9.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  7.1 6.2  24.0 
60%  10.5 1.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.7  14.8 7.0  29.0 
70%  18.2  43.5 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.7  29.9 7.4  31.5 
                
Maximum  tariff,  %            
% of lines with a tariff greater than                 
20%  13.7 42.2 46.4 57.7 66.6 58.6  34.9 55.8 13.0 
30%  9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  33.1  45.6 3.8 
40%  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  29.8  43.8 0.7 
50%  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  13.9 6.4 0.1                  
Low  tariffs            
%  of  lines            
tariff=0% 0.0  0.0  11.6  0.8 22.3  2.1  39.7  6.4 51.3 
tariff<=5%  54.5 15.6 17.2 27.2 22.3 21.1  40.3 26.2 57.1                  
Swiss  coefficients            
% of lines affected by a Swiss coefficient of                 
10  45.3 84.1 82.8 57.7 77.7 78.9  59.7 73.7 42.0 
15  13.7 43.7 46.4 57.7 72.1 78.9  52.6 71.9 34.4 
20  13.7 42.6 46.4 57.7 66.6 59.1  35.1 56.4 33.3 
25  13.7 42.5 46.4 57.7 66.6 58.6  33.2 55.2 31.9 




Impact on SADC food security-relevant tariff lines from different formula and coefficients 









































































Mean  tariffs,  %            
Mean bound tariff, %  55.0  52.0 125.0 100.0 120.0 125.0  115.0 149.0  43.1 
Mean applied tariff, %  2.0 13.6 15.7 19.8 22.7 22.1  27.0 40.7 11.6 
Median applied tariff, %  2.0 10.0 10.0 25.0 25.0 25.0  15.0 40.0  4.0 
Maximum applied tariff, %  2.0 20.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0  80.0  100.0 45.0                  
Average  cut            
% of lines affected by average cut of                 
20%  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  15.6 
30%  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  17.0 
40%  0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  14.7 9.1  20.6 
50%  0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  14.7  13.2  26.2 
60%  0.0 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  24.9  13.2  39.7 
70%  0.0  49.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  44.7  13.2  42.6                  
Maximum  tariff,  %            
% of lines with a tariff greater than                 
20%  0.0 41.1 43.1 75.6 88.8 77.2  44.2 85.3 21.3 
30%  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  44.2  73.6  17.0 
40%  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  44.2  73.6 3.5 
50%  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  21.8  12.7 0.0                  
Low  tariffs            
%  of  lines            
tariff=0%  0.0 0.0 7.1 1.0 7.1 1.5  38.6 0.0  44.7 
tariff<=5%  100.0 9.6 7.6  18.8 7.1 5.6  40.6 5.6  54.6                  
Swiss  coefficients            
% of lines affected by a Swiss coefficient of                 
10  0.0 90.4 92.4 75.6 92.9 94.4  59.4 94.4 70.9 
15  0.0 49.2 43.1 75.6 90.9 94.4  59.4 90.4 65.2 
20  0.0 42.1 43.1 75.6 88.8 77.2  44.7 85.8 63.8 
25  0.0 42.1 43.1 75.6 88.8 77.2  44.7 84.8 61.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Tariff rates obtained from WTO, UNCTAD Trains, SA Customs & Excise databases.
  
A further component of the EU-US proposal is to have a set percentage of tariff lines duty 
free. This would pose a greater threat to the LDCs in the group rather than the developing 
countries which generally (with the exception of Zimbabwe) have a significant percentage of 
duty free lines. Yet as we have argued, there is considerable scope for countries like 
Zimbabwe to be more strategic in their tariff setting. Zimbabwe has only 6.4 per cent of tariff 
lines duty-free, but almost 29 per cent of tariff lines see no trade activity. This may be due, in 
part, to prohibitive tariffs, though a significant part is due to a lack of domestic demand for 
some very narrowly defined product groups. Additionally Zimbabwe has almost 30 per cent 
of its tariff lines at a rate of 5 per cent or less, a portion of which could be moved to zero with 
minimal effect on tariff revenues or production internally.  
The EU-US proposal also includes a Swiss formula that would be applied to a certain 
proportion of tariffs. The Swiss formula would be the most threatening component of any 
formula. Amongst the developing countries that need to make reduction commitments, a  
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modest Swiss formula coefficient of 25 would impact on a third of all tariff lines in the case of 
SACU and Mauritius, and up to 55 per cent of all tariff lines in the case of Zimbabwe.  
3.5  Food security tariff lines 
When we examine the tariff lines associated with food security products, then a similar picture 
emerges. Food security tariff rates are generally higher than those on other agricultural 
products, except in Angola where they are lower. In SACU, for example, the mean bound rate 
in food security products is 9 per cent higher than that of all agricultural products. Food 
security tariff lines may be the first to be affected by reduction commitments. The threat can 
be seen by comparing the effect of an average cut on food security products in comparison to 
all agricultural products for the countries that face reductions in this round. Whilst for 
Mauritius and Zimbabwe any low average cut will still not have an impact, the impact would 
double for food security products (in percentage terms) once cuts reach reasonable levels 
(40 per cent or above). 
Similarly, the use of a maximum tariff in the formula would have a far greater effect on food 
security product lines, most notably for Zimbabwe which has a very high mean tariff of 40 per 
cent for food security products. The use of a percentage of products duty free would have no 
impact on food security lines if countries choose to allocate reductions to other agricultural 
products. Both Mauritius and SACU both have a large portion of food security products 
already subject to duty free access, reflecting a policy of cheaper essentials where no home 
production takes place (most obvious in the case of Mauritius) or it is internationally 
competitive (more obvious in the case of South Africa). Swiss coefficients would have an 
even more dramatic effect. However, the EU-US proposal stresses that the Swiss formula 
would be applied only to a proportion of tariffs, and not all. Given the broad impact of even 
modest coefficients of 25, it is likely that some food security tariff lines will be threatened if 
applied to 50 per cent of all tariff lines.  
3.3 Marrakech  Decision 
The Marrakech Decision focused on the possible negative effects of the reform programme on 
LDCs and NFIDCs and identified potential actions by countries to alleviate these threats. In 
particular, the Marrakech Decision expressed the concern that liberalization might lead to 
negative effects in getting adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs externally on reasonable 
conditions. It further identified the difficulties countries may experience in financing food 
imports. The Decision provides recommendations on food aid, export credits and financing 
facilities. In terms of food aid, the ministers agreed to review levels of food aid, adopt 
guidelines to ensure food aid is fully in grant form, and give full consideration to requests for 
technical and financial assistance to improve agricultural productivity and infrastructure. In 
terms of export credits, the ministers agreed to ensure that the Agriculture Agreement 
covering export credits made appropriate provision for LDCs and NFIDCs. Finally, the 
ministers recognized that these countries may be eligible to draw on the resources of existing 
international financial institutions or such facilities as may be established.  
Developing countries claim that this decision has never been implemented, but the careful 
wording of this decision imposes no obligations on the members (it is a ‘best endeavour’ 
agreement). LDCs are, nevertheless, anxious to have the Marrakech Decision implemented.  
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The Draft General Council Decision of 31 July 2004 included for negotiation aspects of the 
Marrakech Decision.  
The concern in the decision that food aid levels would decrease was unfounded given the 
response to the recent SADC food security crisis (Charman and Hodge 2005). In this 
experience, a central issue became the delivery of food aid in the form of GM maize and not 
grants. The Draft General Council Decision of 31 July 2004 does not agree to provide food 
aid in fully grant form but leaves it open to further negotiation. It states, however, that the 
provision of food aid should not cause commercial displacement, which underlines the 
necessity of maintaining effective incentives for local farmers. The Marrakech Decision 
argued for the establishment of a financing facility to assist countries during crisis. The 
2002-03 southern African food crises highlighted not only the need for such a facility, but 
most importantly for access to grant financing. The main weakness with the Marrakech 
Decision is that it imposes no binding commitments on members and therefore is unlikely to 
be implemented in full. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the WTO will make the 
Marrakech commitments mandatory, as they fall outside the mandate of the WTO itself, 
especially in respect to the financing facility issue. 
4 Conclusion 
Whilst many authors identified the initial AoA as not constraining food security in LDCs and 
NFIDCs, we conclude that the proposed modalities in the current round are also unlikely to 
restrict SADC policies to enhance and assure food availability, access and security. The low 
levels of domestic support and high bound tariffs ensure that agreed reductions would still 
leave members with sufficient policy space to pursue food security agriculture development. 
We concur with the argument that the failure to implement the Marrakech Decision may 
hinder the expedient resolution of future food crises. 
The research finds that the AoA’s primary threat for domestic support for SADC countries 
would come from a reduction in the de minimis allocation to a level that would start to cut into 
current or future planned subsidization, or the removal of Article 6.2 privileges that would 
result in these domestic support measures counting under the de minimis allocation. Whilst 
current support levels are low and decreasing due to budgetary constraints, it is acknowledged 
throughout the region that if household food security is to be addressed, then levels of support 
need to be increased substantially in the future. This includes policies that may not fall into 
the S&D provision or Green Box—for instance, support for emerging farmers and long-term 
welfare transfers.  
The current proposed tariff reductions are unlikely to threaten food security in the region 
because of the high level of ‘air’ in the tariff lines. The most worrying scenario would be the 
setting of a low maximum tariff, which would remove protection from international dumping 
on fragile food crop markets. Whilst other agricultural tariff lines may come under pressure 
for reduction through Swiss formula and duty free components of the modality, SADC 
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